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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
____________
No. 18-2828
____________
IN RE: FRANKLIN X. BAINES,
Petitioner
__________________________________
On a Petition for Writ of Mandamus from
the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
(Related to E.D. Pa Civ. No. 2-12-cv-05672)
District Judge: Honorable Joseph F. Leeson, Jr.
__________________________________
Submitted Pursuant to Rule 21, Fed. R. App. P.
October 25, 2018
Before: SMITH, Chief Judge, AMBRO, and ROTH, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: February 8, 2019)
____________
OPINION*
____________

PER CURIAM
Franklin Baines petitions for a writ of mandamus. For the reasons that follow, we
will deny the petition.

This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not
constitute binding precedent.
*
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Baines is a Pennsylvania state prisoner serving a life sentence with no chance for
parole for a murder he committed at the age of 16. As such, he has a right to be resentenced
in state court under Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012), and Montgomery v. Louisiana,
136 S. Ct. 718 (2016). His Miller claim is presently pending before the Philadelphia Court
of Common Pleas in a timely petition under Pennsylvania’s Post Conviction Relief Act
(“PCRA”), 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. §§ 9541, et seq. Baines has also raised his Miller claim in a
habeas corpus petition, 28 U.S.C. § 2254, which is pending in the United States District
Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania.
In an order dated March 24, 2017, the Magistrate Judge stayed federal proceedings
to allow Baines to exhaust his Miller claim in state court. Baines, who is proceeding pro
se in federal court, filed numerous motions seeking to lift the stay and to be excused from
the exhaustion requirement. In an order dated November 17, 2017 and filed on the civil
docket on November 20, 2017, the Magistrate Judge denied the motions and declined to
lift the stay. In the margin, the Magistrate Judge noted that state court proceedings are
moving forward without undue delay. Baines filed a notice of appeal from the Magistrate
Judge’s order in this Court on December 4, 2017. We dismissed the appeal for lack of
appellate jurisdiction, but directed the Clerk of the District Court to treat the notice of
appeal filed on December 4, 2017 (Docket Entry No. 56) as an appeal to the District Judge
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A).
Meanwhile, on November 20, 2017, Baines filed a petition for writ of mandamus in
this Court, his second such petition in the last two years. On December 19, 2017, we denied
the petition, see In re: Baines, 720 F. App’x 136, 139 (3d Cir. 2017), concluding that Baines
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had not shown a clear and indisputable right to mandamus relief from the habeas
exhaustion requirement. We noted that Baines had filed a notice of appeal from the
Magistrate Judge’s order refusing to lift the stay, and that the District Court had jurisdiction
to review and reconsider the Magistrate Judge’s order if Baines showed “that the ... order
is clearly erroneous or contrary to law,” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A).
Baines then filed another original proceeding in this Court, titled “Application to
File a Rule 60(b) Motion.” Our Clerk treated the application as a mandamus petition,
because, in the main, Baines argued that “there is no justifiable reason for further delay in
[his] resentencing and Montgomery being announce[d] … 31 months ago … thereby
rendering this Court’s prior Order on Baines’ “second” request for mandamus relief
inapplicable ….” Petition, at 20.
We will deny the petition. A writ of mandamus is an extreme remedy that is invoked
only in extraordinary situations. See Kerr v. United States Dist. Court, 426 U.S. 394, 402
(1976). To justify its use, a petitioner must show both a clear and indisputable right to the
writ and that he has no other adequate means to obtain the relief desired. See Haines v.
Liggett Group Inc., 975 F.2d 81, 89 (3d Cir. 1992). The management of its docket is
committed to the sound discretion of the District Court. In re: Fine Paper Antitrust
Litigation, 685 F.2d 810, 817 (3d Cir. 1982). When a matter is discretionary, it cannot
typically be said that a litigant’s right is “clear and indisputable.” Allied Chem. Corp. v.
Daifon, Inc., 449 U.S. 33, 35-36 (1980). Nevertheless, a writ of mandamus may be
warranted where undue delay is tantamount to a failure to exercise jurisdiction. Madden
v. Myers, 102 F.3d 74, 79 (3d Cir. 1996).
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On December 11, 2018, the District Judge ordered the District Attorney of
Philadelphia to “file a response updating this Court as to the status of Baines’s state
proceedings, advising the Court whether state court remedies have been exhausted, and, if
state court remedies have not been exhausted, showing cause why this Court should not
excuse the exhaustion requirement based on delay.” In the margin, the District Judge stated
that a decision on Baines’s motion to lift the stay would be made following receipt of the
District Attorney’s response. On December 31, 2018, the District Attorney submitted his
response, contending that there is no basis to excuse the exhaustion requirement (because
the delay in resentencing Baines under Miller is attributable to Baines’s appeal of a separate
and time-barred guilt phase PCRA claim). Because the District Attorney has responded,
the District Judge will now address Baines’s motion to lift the stay and his contention that
the exhaustion requirement should be excused, and thus mandamus relief is not warranted.
For the foregoing reasons, we will deny the petition for writ of mandamus.
Petitioner’s motions for appointment of counsel are denied.
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